Introduction
The availability of immigrant farmworkers from Mexico may be the single most important factor shaping the future of fruit, vegetable, and horticultural (FVH) production in the United States (U.S.), affecting cropping patterns, choice of production technologies, and the ability of U.S. producers to compete with low-cost producers abroad. According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS), Mexico-born persons represented an estimated 77 percent of the U.S. farm workforce in 1997-98 (up from 57 percent in 1990; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000 and 1991) . Most of these workers (52 percent) were unauthorized. An overwhelming majority originate from households in rural Mexico (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997).
Two major policy changes, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), together with intensified enforcement along the southern U.S. border, were aimed wholly or partially at curtailing the flow of unauthorized Mexico-to-U.S. migration, potentially reducing the supply of labor to U.S. farms. The goal of this research is to econometrically test the effect of these policy changes on the flow of migrant labor from rural Mexico to U.S.
farms. We do this by estimating a model for migration using retrospective data from the 2003 National Mexico Rural Household Survey.
Conceptual Framework
Given individual, household and community characteristics, policy changes may alter the larger milieu within which migration decisions take place. IRCA represented an exogenous policy effort to control migration. In light of U.S. farmers' reliance on unauthorized immigrant labor, IRCA had the potential for disproportionately large impacts on agricultural labor markets. NAFTA was only partially motivated by migration concerns but was expected to have far-reaching impacts on migration flows.
1
Sharp increases in U.S. border enforcement were intended to curtail unauthorized immigration.
All three policies' possible impacts on migration are complex and theoretically ambiguous. For example, although IRCA imposed fines on U.S. employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized immigrants, it also legalized large numbers of unauthorized immigrants already in the United States. NAFTA requires a phase-out of price supports for Mexico's maize farmers, but it also opened up U.S. markets to
Mexican agricultural exports and rural Mexico to U.S. agricultural investments.
Increased U.S. border enforcement, while increasing the cost and risks of border crossings, also discouraged return migration by those who succeed in crossing the border.
Thus, the net effects of these policy shocks on the migration of labor from rural Mexico to U.S. farms are ambiguous and can only be determined empirically.
Isolating effects of policy changes on migration is complicated not only by the plethora of individual, household and community variables influencing migration decisions over time but macroeconomic shocks that may have affected migration. These include major devaluations of the Mexican peso and shifts in per-capita GDP in both countries. Our econometric analysis controls explicitly for these variables. It also 1 Presidents Salinas and Bush argued that opening up markets would help Mexico export more goods and fewer people, thereby reducing migration pressures. However, the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development warned that freer trade could temporarily increase migration pressures as labor markets adjust to new market realities. controls for migration networks or contacts in both farm and non farm labor markets in the United States, represented by lagged stocks of villagers in farm and non farm jobs.
Theoretical Model
At the micro level, international migration is only observed for households and family members that choose to participate in migration, which is a discrete decision.
Migrants are individuals for which the expected benefits of migration, R, exceed the (unobserved) migration "reservation wage," ω. The migration reservation wage depends on local opportunities on and off the farm. Following Mincer, the local wage is a function of human capital that affects the marginal productivity of labor. Let X W denote a vector of human capital characteristics influencing wage income in the local labor market. The productivity of family members' labor on the farm and in other local offfarm activities is shaped both by these human capital variables and by family assets, K .
Remittances are a function of migrants' human capital, which affects earnings, as well as their motivations to remit, which may be influenced by both human capital and family assets (Lucas and Stark, Taylor) . Contacts at migrant destinations are a form of migration capital, K M , that can enhance the labor-market prospects of migrants (Munshi) .
Migrant remittances and reservation wages have both deterministic and stochastic components; thus,
, and u and v are stochastic errors. Letting i δ = 1 if household member i migrates and 0 otherwise, the participation decision becomes:
(1) 
Econometric Model
The econometric model we estimate is a fixed effects panel data model of the following form: 
Estimation and Results
Survey data show an upward trend in migration from Mexican villages to both U.S. farm and nonfarm jobs throughout the period, with migration to nonfarm jobs accelerating during the second half of the decade (Figure 1 ). We estimate the model using ordinary least squares. The data set for this region provides information on migration from 16 villages over 23 years (from 1980 to 2002); however, one year (16 observations) is lost as a result of lagged right-hand-side variables.
Thus, the total sample size is 352. Table 1 presents variable definitions and means and Table 2 non farm jobs is significant at the 10% level, but is much smaller (0.03), suggesting a small network effect that flows from non-farm to farm jobs.
Controlling for time trend and lagged migration, the policy variables are either insignificant or else positively associated with migration to farm jobs. Results suggest that U.S. border enforcement has no effect on the supply of Mexican labor to U.S. farms (t=-0.53). Migration shifts upward following NAFTA, by approximately 0.5 migrants per village (21 households). The 1986 IRCA appears to shift the supply of U.S. farm labor upward, by a similar amount. The small negative coefficient on the time trend suggests a decreasing trend in migration from rural areas in this region to U.S. farm jobs, all else equal. Thus, the increasing migration level that is evident in Figure 1 is attributable to NAFTA and IRCA.
Once we control for the dynamics of the migration process and policy effects, macroeconomic variables do not significantly influence migration. The estimated coefficient on the exchange rate is of the expected sign (peso devaluations increase the returns to migration in pesos), but neither it nor the GDP variables are statistically significant.
Conclusion
Villages in Mexico are the primary source of labor to U.S. farms. The findings reported in this paper suggest that the U.S. farm labor supply from Mexico is a dynamic process, in which past migration is the principal driver of future migration. Our findings support the conclusion of several past studies that networks of existing contacts at migrant destinations are a key determinant of the magnitude of migration and sector of employment for future migrants (Munchi, 2003; Taylor, 1987) . Controlling for migration dynamics, the trend in Mexican migration to U.S. farm jobs is flat or possibly even negative. that "expanded trade between the sending countries and the United States is the single most important remedy" for unwanted migration. However, it also warned that "the economic development process itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration." The same policies that accelerate economic growth, including privatization, land reform, and freer trade, temporarily increase migration pressures, because of the displacement and disruptions that accompany market liberalization (Martin, 1993) .
Increased U.S. expenditures on border enforcement appear to have had no discernable effect on the U.S. farm labor supply from Mexico. The U.S. annual border enforcement budget increased sevenfold between 1980 and 1995, tripled between 1995 and 2001 and now exceeds $2.5 billion. Border enforcement might be analogous to a sea wall that may resist the tide but also prevents waves that pass over it from returning to their source. Stricter border enforcement has increased the probability of apprehension on any crossing attempt and raised the cost of U.S. entry for unauthorized migrants, but most migrants eventually succeed in crossing the border and now appear to stay longer in the United States (Public Policy Institute of California, 2002).
In the long run, the migration of population out of rural areas surely will continue in Mexico, as it did previously in the United States and in all other high-income countries. The econometric findings reported in this paper highlight the difficulty of designing and implementing policies to break this migration dynamic. Despite U.S. 
